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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LIBERTY AND
PROPERTY: A CRITIQUE
PETER N. SIMON
In a widely noted series of cases beginning in 1970, the Supreme
Court had dealt with the question of the extent to which the denial of
governmental benefits constitutes a deprivation of "life, liberty or
property" within the contemplation of the due process clauses of the
Constitution. In Board of Regents v. Roth' and Perry v. Sinderman2,
companion cases decided in 1972, the Court adopted an approach to
this problem generally referred to as the "entitlements" approach.
Under this analysis, those benefits whose disbursement turns upon the
discretion of an administrator are not viewed as property, and are
therefore not subjected to the procedural requirements of the due pro-
cess clauses; those benefits which turn upon the existence vel non of
specified factual criteria, however, are viewed as "property," and must
therefore not be denied without the benefits of such procedural safe-
guards as might be required by the due process clauses.
In his article Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government
Benefits,3 Professor Stephen Williams advanced an original and pro-
vocative alternative to the Supreme Court's "entitlements" approach.
His article raised cogent criticisms of the prevailing Supreme Court
approach,4 and of the two other approaches which have substantial
judicial and academic support.5 In lieu of these approaches, Professor
Williams proposed an economic model to perform the difficult task of
identifying those governmental benefits which ought to be protected
by the due process clauses.
Professor Williams starts with the constitutional text. According
1. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
2. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
3. Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3
(1983).
4. Williams, supra note 3, at 4-14. I defend the Court's current approach in an article published,
by coincidence, in the same month as Professor Williams'. See Simon, Liberty and Property in the
Supreme Court. A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 146 (1983).
5. Williams, supra note 3, at 14-19 (criticizing the "important interests" approach of Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and an approach best referred to as "liberty as freedom from arbitrary
adjudicative procedures"). The latter approach was proposed by Professor William Van Alstyne in his
article, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 COR-
NELL L. REV. 445 (1977); Professor Van Alstyne's approach was subsequently adopted by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, in its interpretation of the California State Constitution's due process clause. See
People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 260, 599 P.2d 622, 158 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1979).
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to his research, the fifth amendment's due process clause was origi-
nally intended to protect against procedurally deficient deprivation of
life, liberty or property in criminal proceedings, brought about by
means of execution, incarceration or forfeitures.6 The evidence con-
cerning the meaning of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause
is not so clear as the evidence of the fifth amendment's due process
clause; on balance, however, the evidence suggests that the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause also was intended to deal only with
governmental actions associated with criminal trials.7
Today's due process clauses, of course, could hardly be squeezed
back into their historical molds. As Professor Williams observes, the
first major expansion of these provisions came during the period be-
tween 1897 and 1925. By the end of that period, the Supreme Court
had read the clauses "to protect the various forms of what Isaiah Ber-
lin has called negative liberty, or freedom from governmental re-
straints."8 The Court had not read the clauses as entitling individuals
to affirmative benefits from the government, but it had read the clauses
as protecting substantial areas of individual activities against undue
government control. Further, the Court had been willing to extend
due process beyond the originally contemplated context of criminal
proceedings.
The second great step in the expansion of due process clauses,
according to Professor Williams, has come since 1970. In the series of
cases beginning with Goldberg v. Kelly,9 the Court has read the due
process clauses as requiring the government to provide certain affirma-
tive benefits - an extension from the protection of "negative liberties"
to the protection of "positive liberties."
Isaiah Berlin's distinction between negative liberties and positive
liberties is central to Professor Williams' article. "Negative liberty" is
the right to be free from governmental interference. "Positive liberty,"
as the term is used in Professor Willams' article, is the right to demand
certain rights, privileges or things from the government. Examples of
the former are the rights to labor, pray and speak as one chooses; ex-
amples of the latter (at least at first glance) are the right to attend
government schools, the right to use the government's roads, and the
right to receive welfare payments, governmental jobs, and government
contracts.
6. Williams, supra note 3, at 20. Professor Williams examines the textual evidence in detail in
Williams, "Liberty" in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: The Framers'
Intentions, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 117 (1981).
7. Williams, supra note 3, at 20.
8. Id.
9. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See supra notes 1, 2 and accompanying text.
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In Professor Williams' view, the enlargement of the due process
clause from protection against arbitrary execution, incarceration and
forfeitures, to protection of negative liberties in general, though a sig-
nificant expansion, was "consistent with the original constitutional
framework of limited government and individual liberties."'" In his
opinion, however, the later developments go far beyond any reason-
able connection with either the text or the purpose of the due process
clauses.1 Accordingly, his analysis would limit application of due
process review to cases involving interests of life, conventional prop-
erty, and negative liberty.' 2
Discerning which governmental actions impinge upon negative
liberties, however, is a much more subtle task than at first it might
seem. The all-pervasive nature of government activities today means
that an administrative action which appears merely to terminate an
affirmative benefit might really constitute an interference with negative
liberty. For example, because of the prevalence of government educa-
tion and government roads, a rule which excluded an individual from
using government schools or government roads would have an effect
very similar to the interference with negative liberties which Professor
Williams is willing to read into the framers' intentions. Accordingly,
if the due process clauses are to protect only negative liberties, a test
must be devised to identify those government benefits whose depriva-
tion will constitute a denial of negative liberty.
Professor Williams looks, for his definition of negative liberty, to
the world as it existed at an earlier time. If, in that world, the private
market would have provided a particular benefit, and if governmental
activity since that time has significantly lessened the availability of
that benefit from the private market, then government activity has in-
terfered with the individual's freedom to obtain the benefit on his
own.' 3 In effect, his negative liberty to compete for that benefit has
been replaced by the opportunity of obtaining that benefit from the
government. If an administrator terminates his access to the benefit,
that termination should be viewed as involving either the liberty or
property protected by the due process clauses.
Professor Williams describes two ways in which government ac-
tivity may lessen the availability of benefits from private sources - by
foreclosing those private sources (for example, by its regulation or tax-
ation of the field), or by forcing "the claimant, if he is to use a private
10. Williams, supra note 3, at 20.
11. Id. at 20-21.
12. Id. at 21.
13. Id. at 21-23.
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market substitute, in effect to pay twice for the same good." 4 If either
of these has happened, then the government's dispensation of the bene-
fit ought to conform to the procedural requirements of the due process
clauses.
A brief example should make his proposal clear. Primary educa-
tion exemplifies both forms of government activity. First, the govern-
ment's use of taxation, plus its massive subsidy of public primary
education, frequently "makes it economically impossible for a private
grade school to complete successfully." 5 The effect has been a sub-
stantial narrowing (though not an absolute elimination) of the private
market alternatives to public education at the primary level. Second,
the substantial sums raised by property taxes earmarked for public ed-
ucation leads to at least the tentative conclusion that most individuals
pay every year for public education, whether or not they or their chil-
dren make use of it. 6 An individual who then chooses to send his
child to a private school will have to pay twice, once for the public
education which he has chosen not to use, and once for the private
tuition at the school he has actually chosen. Forcing the individual to
pay for public education, whether or not he uses it, significantly
reduces his ability to use private alternatives; therefore, his access to
public education ought to be protected by the due process clauses.
At the outset, Professor Williams should saluted for his proposal.
It is unique. It is original. Above all, it emphasizes that which ought
to be emphasized - constitutional rules should relate, as closely as
possible, to the intentions actually expressed in the Constitution it-
self. 7 The question remains, however, whether his proposal is so
much more useful than the entitlement analysis adopted by the Court
in Roth, that the consistent practice of the post-Roth cases ought to be
rejected in its favor.
In short, Professor Williams proposes that a benefit is "property"
when the state has substantially precluded private market alternatives
that would otherwise have existed.'8 This proposal has five substantial
14. Id. at 22.
15. Id. at 23.
16. As discussed by Professor Williams, the fact that a particular percentage of the usual real
property taxes is "earmarked" for the public school system is not quite the same as forcing the taxpayer
to pay for the school system. See id. at 24-27. But it is close enough to justify treating it as a direct
forced payment to the school system, particularly in view of the fact that taxpayers are asked to view
the tax as a direct payment to the school system. See id. at 25.
17. The article is to be appreciated, too, for reminding us of the difference between the govern-
ment as regulator and the government as a proprietary enterprise. This distinction seems blurred by the
Court, which has failed to distinguish cases involving occupational licensing from cases involving gov-
ernment employment. See id. at 31-34.
18. See id. at 22. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. My focus will be on government
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disadvantages. First, it asks that serious litigation turn upon the an-
swer to a question which is simply unanswerable. Second, though it
starts with the text of the Constitution, it ends up as little more than
an effort to constitutionalize free market economic analysis. Third, it
ignores Roth's great virtue: the protection of administrative discre-
tion.' 9 Fourth, it would have a certain "hit-or-miss" capriciousness in
the interests protected; important interests would be unprotected,
while less important interests would be protected. Finally, it gives
meanings to "liberty" and "property" which seem unrelated to any
natural or common meaning given those terms.
The first and most serious problem with Professor Williams' pro-
posal is that it is unmanageable. Whether the protections of the due
process clauses will extend to a particular government-provided bene-
fit under his analysis seems to turn upon whether that benefit would
have been available from the private market in the absence of the large
increase in governmental activity over the past century; in other
words, the question turns upon speculation about the hypothetical
availability of a market if our country were being run with a nine-
teenth century government in a twentieth century world. One is re-
minded of Judge Friendly's comment, in a famous renvoi case, that
"[o]ur principal task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to deter-
mine what the New York courts would think the California courts
would think on an issue about which neither has thought."20 As ar-
cane as that question might have been, Professor Williams' question
would be even more so.
The problem with Professor Williams' inquiry is not that it calls
for fine line-drawing, but that it is by its very nature unanswerable.
There is simply no means, other than pure speculation, for a judge to
answer the following question: would this benefit have been available
from the private market today if the government had not grown so
large? As a natural result of the speculation called for by this ques-
tion, most benefits could be analyzed in a number of different ways,
some leading to one conclusion and some to the other. Professor Wil-
liams himself gives the example of law teachers, who could be consid-
ered either teachers, in which case their employment might be
"property," or lawyers, in which case their employment probably
foreclosure of the private market alternative. The "pay twice" aspect of Professor Williams' analysis
can be viewed as a subcategory of government foreclosure - by charging for a particular service,
whether or not one chooses to use it, the government forecloses the private market alternative from
those consumers who are either unwilling or unable to pay twice for the same benefit.
19. See Simon, supra note 4, passim.
20. Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960).
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would not be considered "property."'" Policemen could be considered
as eligible for police work, which is government dominated, or as se-
curity employees, for which there still remains a substantial private
market.22 As a general matter, it would seem that the answer would
almost always turn upon the level of generality with which the ques-
tion was asked - even the President could be viewed as either the
Commander-in-Chief, or simply a managerial executive. The only
limits on the judge deciding the case would seem to be his imagination
and his mood - hardly a recommendation for a system of law.
There is an additional, related problem. In addition to being, at
bottom, an imponderable question, the inquiry called for by Professor
Williams' article is one which, if it were answerable, would be answer-
able only by economists. Even an economist would ultimately rely on
his biases to answer the question posed by Professor Williams' propo-
sal. An attorney not fortunate enough to have great sophistication in
the science of economics would hardly know where to begin, were he
asked whether the benefit at issue would have been available from the
private market had government remained at its nineteenth century
proportions.
To put the matter in context, imagine that you are in the county
attorney's office, and have been asked to advise the responsible county
official whether a hearing is required prior to the termination of indi-
vidual benefits under a particular county home relief program. What
advice would you give, if the ultimate outcome of litigation were to
turn on the following analysis?
It seems virtually certain that government provision of welfare has
entailed a degree of preclusion of the private charitable market.
The demand for private welfare services arises out of private indi-
viduals' readiness to pay for the provision of relief to the needy.
With government supply obviously meeting a portion of this de-
mand, the private supply is presumably less than it would be in the
absence of government intervention. How much less is an empiri-
cal issue, requiring information on the relief contributions of the pri-
vate and public sectors and, in principle at least, some basis for
projecting the amount of private relief that would have been avail-
able in the absence of government action.23
21. Williams, supra note 3, at 30. Professor Williams seems to conclude that even if a government
job would otherwise qualify as "property" under his proposal, the fact that the individual could have
chosen an entirely different career and thereby avoided government employment should preclude his
due process claim. But his discussion of law teachers and his discussion of policemen demonstrate an
underlying, broad problem with his analysis - its indeterminacy.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added).
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Professor Williams anticipates this criticism, by suggesting that
courts develop rules of thumb: "For example, it might suffice to find
present government control of, say, more than 50 percent of the mar-
ket relevant to the specific program."24 One shudders to contemplate
the situation as we await the judicial development of these rules of
thumb. Then, assuming that the courts could agree within a finite pe-
riod of time, or that the Supreme Court might settle the issue some-
time within the next two decades, just what would we have? A rule
which says that where the particular government (or all governments,
taken as a group - if that is what the "rule of thumb" calls for) pro-
vides half the type of relief in question, the due process clauses control,
but not elsewhere. This would seem to have only the loosest associa-
tion with the question of whether, if there were less government, this
particular benefit would be so much more readily available from the
private sector that the government should be subjected to constitu-
tional controls in its dispensation of the benefit. Indeed, much of the
welfare provided by the government is so different from that which has
traditionally been available from private sources, that this rule would
have a perverse effect. With regard to those benefits which were un-
likely to be developed as private sources, the government will ordina-
rily be the primary source, and will therefore be more likely to be
subjected to constitutional scrutiny, although it is acting in an area in
which it has not narrowed private market alternatives. For example,
umemployment insurance (as opposed to disability insurance) is pro-
vided largely, if not exclusively, by government. Under Professor Wil-
liams' rule of thumb, these benefits would constitute "property," even
though they have not displaced private alternatives. Professor Wil-
liams' main claim for his proposal, its consistency with the due process
clauses' implicit purpose of protecting negative liberties, seems largely
to be lost when it is tranlated into his proposed "fifty percent" rule of
thumb.
There is one other wrinkle to the manageability problem, which is
suggested by Professor Williams' discusison of primary education. He
suggests that not only must we determine whether, in the absence of
governmental expansion, the private market would have provided the
particular benefit in question, but we must then determine the level of
procedures which would have been provided by those hypothetical pri-
vate alternatives.25
24. Id. at 37.
25. Professor Williams suggests that this question might be answered by reference to "[v]estigial
private alternatives," which "might provide evidence as to what procedures were reasonable." See id.
at 24.
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In all the educational examples, the nature of the private alterna-
tive foreclosed is in some degree a matter of speculation: perhaps the
private schools which would have existed would all have reserved the
right to expel or suspend a student with little or no "process. "26
Under this proposal, then, the constitutionality of an administrator's
actions would turn upon a judge's (or a jury's) guess about what pri-
vate market alternatives would have been available, and the judge's (or
jury's) guess about what level of procedural protection would have
been provided by such private market alternatives as would have been
available. It is hard to imagine what sort of advice one could give to
an administrator, when the legality of his actions will ultimately turn
upon the answer to such a question.
The second problem with the proposal, almost as serious as the
first, is philosophical. The constitutional language in question, of
course, protects against the deprivation of "life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." Professor Williams would read this as
protecting only "the interests entitled to due process protection as of
1925 - life, negative liberty, and conventional property. '27 He then
further translates this into a formula which imposes due process pro-
tections upon the government only when it has substantially interfered
with the private market. Underlying all of this, there seems to be the
assumption that if the matter had all been left to the private market, it
would have worked itself out to the right conclusion. Therefore, what
the judges and justices must do - what the Constitution requires them
to do - is guess at how the private market would have worked out
each of these particular problems, had the government's expansion not
interfered with the private market's development. Even if such an ap-
proach could be made to work, it would be inappropriate for the
Supreme Court to adopt it.
Generations of constitutional law students have grown up with
Justice Holmes' aphorism, in his Lochner dissent, that "[tihe Four-
teenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Stat-
ics.112s Professor Williams' proposal seems based, ultimately, on the
view that the fifth and fourteenth amendments did enact the framers'
(and Professor Williams') laissez faire economic philosophy. I am
sympathetic to Professor Williams' desire that the Supreme Court re-
turn to those economic philosophies which prevailed when the Consti-
tution itself was adopted. I do not believe, however, that the Court is
about to enact that economic philosophy, or any economic philoso-
26. Id.
27. Id. at 21.
28. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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phy, into constitutional law; nor, on balance, do I believe that it
should. Economic orthodoxy is fine when it can be countered by the
rough and tumble of the political process, but orthodoxy of any sort is
dangerous when it infects the all-powerful Supreme Court.
The third problem with Professor Williams' approach is that it
affords insufficient protection to administrative discretion. Theoreti-
cally, it would seem possible for a court to hold that administrative
action deprives an individual of liberty or property, and is therefore
subject to the procedural requirements of the due process clauses, and
at the same time also hold that adminstrative discretion is so impor-
tant to the particular decision that no judicially reviewable procedural
requirements will be imposed by the courts. As a practical matter,
however, this has not happened, and is not likely to happen. Rather,
the tendency has been to impose what is viewed as a minimal require-
ment upon the administrator - the requirement that he or she pro-
vide the disappointed individual with a statement of reasons. But, in
order for this requirement to have any teeth whatsoever, judicial re-
view must be available to guarantee the substantive acceptability of the
reasons given, to guarantee that the reasons given the deprived indi-
vidual were in fact the reasons relied upon by the administrator, to
guarantee that there was some basis in fact for the administrator's con-
clusions, and to make certain that the administrator did not in some
manner interfere with the individual's opportunity to respond to the
reasons specified by the administrator.29 Without such review, an ad-
ministrator could make a farce of a "reasons" requirement.30 In short,
a simple reasons requirement doesn't accomplish much unless it is ju-
dicially enforced, and the consequences of judicial enforcement of a
reasons requirement, ultimately, will be judicialization of the formerly
discretionary administrative decision. Therefore, as a practical mat-
ter, the determination that an administrative decision implicates the
due process clause bodes ill for the survival of the administrator's dis-
cretion in future decisions affecting the same interest. Roth's defini-
tion of property as an expectation to which the individual is
"entitled," as opposed to expectations which turn upon an administra-
tor's discretion, provides a nicely tailored protection of administrative
29. See Gouge v. Joint School Dist. No. 1, 310 F. Supp. 984, 991 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
30. Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through a Reasons
Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 60, 84 (1976):
If the requirement of a rational explanation is to have meaning it must be based on more
than an unenforceable obligation to supply reasons. Without some form of judicial review,
the individual would remain vulnerable to irrevocable changes in status unsupported by an
adequate explanation since the reasons requirement could be ignored with impunity.
See also Simon, supra note 4, at 158-163.
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discretion.3"
Professor Williams' approach would provide no such protection.
For example, he concludes that primary and secondary education are
areas in which government coercion has driven out significant private
market alternatives to the government's product.3" Accordingly, stu-
dents would have a "property" in their public education, and by impli-
cation (at least arguably) teachers would have a "property" in their
public school employment.33 The consequence of Professor Williams'
test would appear to be that every single decision affecting either stu-
dents or teachers would be subject to the due process clause. Of
course, this does not mean that an adversay hearing would be required
as to every decision; that would turn on the determination of the ques-
tion, "what process is due?" But the inevitable tendency of such an
approach would be judicialization of the school house.3 4
The fourth problem with Professor Williams' proposal is the ca-
pricious fashion in which it singles out interests to be protected. While
the theory behind it seems logical, in practice it would seem to have a
certain "hit-or-miss" quality. For example, a policeman might not
have a property interest in his job, but a fireman probably would; an
applicant for a one-day elementary school substitute teaching job
would have a property interest in his or her hope of being hired, but a
tenured law professor might not.3" The fact that this approach pro-
tects unimportant expectations and does not protect important ones,
and the fact that it ignores the important policies protected by Roth,
would not be fatal defects if the scheme were, in fact, that which the
constitutional draftsmen comtemplated. But the historical link be-
tween the proposal and the draftsmen's intentions seems altogether
too attenuated to support its otherwise capricious results.
Finally, while Professor Williams' proposal is interesting and pro-
vocative, it has no resemblance to any popular or technical use of the
term "property" currently in use. One of the real advantages of Roth's
definition of property is that it is consistent with the widely held un-
31. This is the gist of my defense of Roth. See Simon, supra note 4, at 163-66. Perhaps the closest
judicial expression of this rationale is Justice White's, in his opinion for the Court in Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215 (1976).
32. Williams, supra note 3, at 21-27.
33. But see supra note 21.
34. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Professor Williams is sensitive to this concern, and
would apparently deal with it by urging judges to show "a great deal of deference to legislative or
administrative judgment about appropriate procedures." Williams, supra note 3, at 27. The courts,
however, have not been highly responsive to similar urgings in the past. See Nagel, Separation of
Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978). See also Wilkinson,
Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School Superintendent, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 25.
35. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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derstanding that property consists of expectations which one can insist
upon, not those which turn upon the discretion of another.3 6 The no-
tion that "property" constitutes the opportunity to compete for those
benefits which would have been available from the private market "but
for" the growth of government, is hardly a familiar, convenient, or
manageable use of the term.
The Supreme Court adopted its "entitlement" analysis thirteen
years ago. Since that time, it has shown a great deal more consistency
in this area that in most other fields of constitutional law. Not only is
it an approach which works, but it serves important institutional inter-
ests. All this should create a substantial presumption against alterna-
tive proposals. Though his analysis is useful, and his suggestions at
the very least are provocative, Professor Williams has not rebutted the
presumption.
36. See Jackson v. Housel, 17 Johns. 280, 283 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820) ("Property is defined to
be. . .that right which one hath to lands or tenements, goods or chattels, which no way depend on
another man's courtesy.") See also Simon, supra note 4, at 171-72.
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